Reading: Hudson Rock finds malicious Optimizely code in major websites

Hudson Rock finds malicious Optimizely code in major websites

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Hudson Rock says it recovered malicious Optimizely project files and a minute-long loader tied to poisoned third-party JavaScript on major websites, including, Zoom and GitLab. The finding puts a fresh spotlight on how script-and-widget delivery can be turned into a stealthy channel for browser attacks without touching the sites’ own core systems.

The reason this is drawing attention now is not just the names involved. Kirk’s archived verification work covered 15 captures, and his table overlapped Hudson Rock’s findings for, Zoom and GitLab while adding 12 more properties. Together, the two tables identify 21 named web properties with the same kind of evidence: malicious code served through third-party endpoints rather than a clean breach of the websites themselves.

At the center of the Optimizely case is customer projectJS. The injection sits inside those configurations alongside legitimate experimentation code, which is why the malicious payload can blend into normal page behavior. In the and HSBC UAE specimens, the recovered material includes a complete fallback payload, while Hootsuite and Talkwalker share one poisoned project. Talkwalker’s homepage HTML also directly referenced 4894383279964160.js, a concrete marker that the malicious delivery was present in live site code paths.

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Kirk’s table goes further than Hudson Rock’s overlap. It adds 12 properties beyond, Zoom and GitLab, and Hudson Rock’s and Kirk’s combined evidence set includes 21 named web properties. That list also gives historical Optimizely response evidence for, Salesforce, Mutual of Omaha and, with the file identified as /js/5728063363743744.js. Kirk also reports 51 traced sites in the wider investigation, showing that the observed trail extends well beyond the documented subset.

But the evidence stops short of proving a compromise of the named websites’ backend systems. What it does show is malicious code inside responses from third-party providers’ own script and widget endpoints, which is enough to create a serious browser-side exposure even if the underlying sites were not breached. The scale remains unresolved: the number of malicious page loads, successful thefts and compromised devices is still unknown, and the documented 21 properties are not the full incident count.

That leaves the biggest unanswered point where it belongs: how the malicious Optimizely code was inserted into customer projectJS configurations in the first place. Hudson Rock had earlier reviewed Amirul Cyber’s OptimJack research, but the recovered files do not explain the initial injection path. For now, the story is not that a single website was hacked. It is that poisoned third-party code spread across a set of major web properties, and the trail that can be verified is still narrower than the damage it may have caused.

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