Marcelo Queiroz presented a substitute text to PLP 281/2019 on 14 de outubro de 2026 in the Plenário da Câmara, setting out a new legal framework for handling troubled institutions in the financial sector. The proposal creates two resolution regimes, one for stabilization and another for compulsory liquidation, and assigns the BCB, the Susep or the CVM the power to apply them, depending on the entity involved.
The measure would reach institutions authorized to operate by those supervisors and would cover the financial system, the payment system, insurance, capitalization, reinsurance and open private pension systems. In practice, that means the new rules would extend beyond banks alone and into a broad slice of the market where failure can ripple quickly through deposits, payments and savings products.
The logic of the text is to force losses first onto shareholders. It provides for share capital to be reduced to R$ 1 and for credits to be converted into shares before any public money enters the picture. Only after those steps, and after the resources of the resolution fund are exhausted, could loans or temporary capitalization by the União be considered. Any such support would still need approval from the Conselho Monetário Nacional, which would also have to notify the Senado within five business days. The Senado could then suspend new disbursements.
That is the key break from ordinary rescue language. A regime of stabilization is designed to keep the institution functioning while its problems are handled; compulsory liquidation is the cleaner exit, used when the institution must be wound down under official control. The substitute also sharpens the personal exposure of those who ran the company by proposing a subjective liability regime with inversion of the burden of proof for administrators and controllers. In other words, they would be the ones forced to show they did not act improperly, rather than the state having to prove everything from scratch.
There is, however, a gap between the scope of the text and its legislative status. The substitute expands resolution powers, adds conditions for Union support and introduces new mechanisms for dealing with losses, but the chamber record still does not show a vote or any further processing. That leaves the proposal important enough to reshape how the system would respond to distress, but still short of becoming law.
For now, the answer to what happens next is simple: the substitute waits for a vote that has not yet been recorded. Until that happens, the proposal remains a detailed plan for crisis management, not a rule in force.
